2.0 |
Certain models of reproduction tend to privilege dyads
as the basic units of interaction. The dyad in
turn is locked onto one sensory modality. This
structure generates a closed system and guarantees the
model's explanatory power. It makes an elegant
story with perfect pretensions to scienticity. No
extraneous details or third parties to complicate
matters.
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2.0 |
2.1 |
For example, the relationship between State and
citizen-worker, in Louis Althusser's examination of
social reproduction, is sealed in a structure of
specularity. Not all cases offer themselves so
transparently. Mary O'Brien, for one, does not
foreground sensory modalities when she links
reproductive and temporal consciousness. However,
her materialist account of biological reproduction does
rest ultimately upon an insufficiently critiqued
idealist moment of fusion. That moment is cast in
the idiom of a single sensory modality, the idiom of
touch. Since both the idiom and the moment are
imported from Hegel, one could speak of discursive
contamination. However her susceptibility is not
so much a function of insufficient critique of her
German pretext as related to her rhetorical adoption of
Christian myth.
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2.1 |
2.2 |
First, O'Brien reads differences in reproductive
consciousness off differences in anatomy. This
incipient determinism is circumvented by an appeal to
history. According to her, developments in
contraceptive technology have supplied conditions under
which women's reproductive consciousness no longer
differs from that of men. This movement registers
in her discourse as the story of a fall (n1).
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2.2 |
2.3 |
If O'Brien's is a Miltonic pattern, Althusser's is
Dantesque. Movements of ascension mark
Althusser's discourse on social reproduction. In
his paradigm case, schooling is designed so that at
each level a number of students enter the workplace to
occupy places in the hierarchy of class. However,
it is not only the analogy with a static series of
circles that renders the comparison with the divine
comedy model salient. There is also the
disposition of the argument. Althusser carefully
culminates his exposition if not with a beatific vision
then with the solemnisation of a formal structure for
all ideology. The particular dynamic of the
sensory modalities played out in this general structure
owes much to Althusser's choices in the exemplification
of the general form of ideology, in particular his
recourse to Christian trinitarian dogma.
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2.3 |
2.4 |
A stark ascetic streak permits Althusser to arrive at
this point. He neglects relations of
consumption. He favours analysis of the
reproduction of the relations of production. His
concern is the making of workers. Hence, in
Althusser's discourse, ideology is set the task of
dominating bodily drives. This design stems not
only from Christian residues in his thought but also
from a selective importation of psychoanalytic
elements. The project of the care of a child is
envisaged by Althusser in his essay "Freud and
Lacan" as a story of progress through
repression. For him, it is bringing an animal
being into the human condition: "the
extraordinary adventure which from birth to the
liquidation of the Oedipal phase transforms a small
animal conceived by a man and a woman into a small
human child" (Lenin
and Philosophy 189). Social reproduction has the
form of a conversion narrative, a being called.
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2.4 |
2.5 |
Name giving and recognition become central to the
workings of ideology. The fluid operation of
these functions relies on a synchronization of the
senses. The essay "Ideology and Ideological
State Apparatuses" assumes a congruence between
hearing and sight. As interpellation discursively
shifts to specularity, the ideological game becomes one
of namer naming the (already) named. Althusser is
of course highlighting the role of ideology in
constraining heterogeneity, limiting options and
naturalizing existing conditions. This leaves
little conceptual space for a counter-hegemonic
ideology. One place to begin is to question his
projection of a visual dyad onto the hearing situation
and to examine how such a visual dyad is constructed
through his privileging of a mirror metaphor.
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2.5 |
2.6 |
Althusser's essay "Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses" was first published June 1970 in
La Pensée. The piece consists
of two sections. The first and longer section is
dated January-April 1969. This section describes
the two types of state apparatus, repressive and
ideological (in that order) and explains the workings
of interpellation and specularity (in that
order). The order contributes to the
progressively deterministic tone of the presentation
for if the activity of state repression is conceived as
intermittent, ideology is not. The ordering also
facilitates movement from intersubjective to
intrapsychic phenomena. This sequence should not
necessarily generate a greater degree of
determinism. However, as Althusser moves from
examining groups, specifically classes in conflict and
their interactions with state apparatus, to examining
how an individual is constructed as a subject, his
discourse skids on a static structure, a non-
dialectical dyad. Althusser's specular dyad
derives from his particular understanding of the
Lacanian mirror stage. As such it
partakes of the one-way vector found in the Oedipal
narrative of psychoanalysis where it is axiomatic that
a child seek to resemble a single parent.
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2.6 |
2.7 |
As well the deterministic tone and thrust of Althusser's formulations stem from the relationship his essay cultivates with the discourse of psychoanalysis: If eternal means, not transcendent to all (temporal) history, but omnipresent, trans- historical and therefore immutable in form throughout the extent of history, I shall adopt Freud's expression word for word, and write ideology is eternal, exactly like the unconscious. (Lenin and Philosophy 152) |
2.7 |
2.8 |
A post scriptum dated April 1970 contributes an important modulation of the deterministic pronouncements of the earlier section. Rereading himself a year later Althusser highlights the schematic nature of his set of theses. He points out that they are obviously abstract. Criteria for abstraction vary. In some regards Althusser's theses are insufficiently abstract for they do not translate specularity out of its sensory encasement. To do so would reveal the circularity of the specular model and such a formalization would expose its tautological status. However, Althusser does not view abstraction as a move to greater mathematical or logical formalism. His focus is upon abstraction as a move away from, in his case, an underlying reality, a final instance, a first cause: The total process of the realization of the reproduction of the relations of production is therefore still abstract, insofar as it has not adopted the point of view of this class struggle. To adopt the point of view of reproduction is therefore, in the last instance, to adopt the point of view of the class struggle. (Lenin and Philosophy 171) |
2.8 |